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ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS: THE PERFECT DEFENSE FOR LAW SCHOOL DECEIT
By
Jeremy Alm*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the United States Supreme Court gave the Federal Arbitration Act a robust
interpretation, arbitration agreements can be found in a variety of consumer contexts.1
Even educational institutions are opting for Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)
agreements with students.2 Only a few law schools, however, are opting for arbitration
agreements, even though law schools are increasingly targeted with litigation.3 It would
seem that the uneasy future of some law schools might pose a prime place for arbitration
agreements to take root.4 This article will serve as a warning that future law students

* Juris Doctor expected, Hamline University School of Law, 2014. The author would like to thank his wife
for her encouragement and regular pep talks; Professor David Larson, Hamline University School of Law,
for his inspiration and guidance; his family for their steadfast support; and the Yearbook on Arbitration and
Mediation staff for the opportunity to publish his work and for their help.
1

See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (holding arbitration agreements should not be “subject
to any additional limitations under state law”); Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996)
(holding “[c]ourts may not, however, invalidate arbitration agreements under state law applicable only to
arbitration provisions”); Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (expanding the Federal
Arbitration Act to include employment agreements); see also Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147
(7th Cir. 1997) (upholding an arbitration agreement in a “shrink wrap contract” that came with consumer’s
computer purchase); Wash. Mutual Fin. Grp. v. Bailey, 364 F.3d 260 (5th Cir. 2004) (reversing lower court
decision that arbitration clause was unconscionable because borrower was illiterate); McKenzie Check
Advance of Miss. v. Hardy, 866 So. 2d 446, 454-55 (Miss. 2004) (holding that arbitration agreement was
conscionable in check advance loan contract); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995)
(holding that termite extermination services contract had a valid arbitration clause); Carbajal v. H&R Block
Tax Servs., Inc., 372 F.3d 903 (7th Cir. 2004) (upholding adhesion contract’s arbitration clause in tax
preparation service contract).
2

See ARGOSY UNIV., INSTITUTIONAL POLICES, ARBITRATION AGREEMENT, available at
http://catalog.argosy.edu/content.php?catoid=21&navoid=1428#Arbitration_Agreement (last visited Apr.
7, 2014); DEVRY UNIVERSITY, ENROLLMENT AGREEMENT, available at http://www.highschool.devry.edu/pdf/Passport2College.pdf.
3

See also Harnish v. Widener Univ. Sch. of Law, 931 F. Supp. 2d 641 (D.N.J.2013); Gomez-Jimenez v.
N.Y. Law Sch., 943 N.Y.S.2d 834 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012); MacDonald v. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch., 880
F. Supp. 2d 785 (W.D. Mich. 2012) (students sued arguing they reasonably relied on faulty employment
statistics); see generally infra notes 14-27 (discussing lawsuits against law schools and dwindling
enrollment numbers). Some unaccredited law schools have opted for enrollment agreements with
arbitration agreements. See CONCORD LAW SCHOOL, CONCORD LAW SCHOOL ENROLLMENT AGREEMENT,
available
at
http://www.concordlawschool.edu/uploadedFiles/CLS_Concord_Law_School/Concord_Law_School_Doc
uments/CLS%20Enrollment%20Agreement%20Oct%2012_CLICK%282%29.pdf (last visited Apr. 2,
2014). This is not meant to suggest, though, that any law school that opts for an arbitration agreement is
inherently deceptive in nature.
4

Compare Gomez-Jimenez, 943 N.Y.S.2d at 843, with Harnish, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 654.

417

should be wary of the unfair protections of arbitration clauses. 5 First, this article will
illustrate how educational institutions contract regularly with students. Next, this article
will propose why law schools could be tempted by the protective qualities of arbitration
agreements. And finally, this article will compare the pros and cons of arbitration
agreements to further illustrate the detriment such agreement would pose on current and
prospective law students.
II.

BINDING STUDENTS WITH IMPLIED CONTRACTS

Law schools contract with their students all the time. While formal contracts are
not frequently used, implied contracts are often created when students exchange tuition
for educational services. 6 The terms and conditions of the implied contract are then
established through any publication released by the educational institution, such as
“catalogs, bulletins, circulars, and institution regulations given to the student.”7 If a law
school chose to have its students agree to an arbitration agreement, all that would be
required is for the school to place the clause in a school publication.8 In fact, the way
schools contract with their students is analogous to the often-cited case Hill v. Gateway
2000, Inc.9
In Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., the Plaintiffs bought a computer from the
Defendant without first being given the terms and conditions (which included an
arbitration agreement).10 The terms and conditions were sent with the computer, and the
Plaintiffs had 30 days to reject the conditions of the purchase by sending the computer
back for a full refund.11 The Court upheld the arbitration agreement because “[c]ustomers
as a group are better off when vendors skip costly and ineffectual steps such as telephonic
recitation, and use instead a simple approve-or-return device.”12 In the same light, law
5

See generally infra notes 38-46.

6

Kashmiri v. Regents, 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 635, 650 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 2007) (holding “no formal contract
exists between the University and the professional student subclass, but that an implied contract was
created by the students' conduct when they accepted the University's offer of enrollment”); see also People
ex rel. Cecil v. Bellevue Hosp. Med. Coll., 14 N.Y.S. 490 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.1891), aff'd sub nom. People ex
rel. Cecil v. Bellevue Hosp. Med. Coll. of N.Y., 128 N.Y. 621, 28 N.E. 253 (N.Y. 1891).
7

Zumbrun v. Univ. of S. Cal., 101 Cal. Rptr. 499, 504 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1972) (citations omitted).

8

Like any contract, contractual defenses can be used to invalidate such agreements. See Miler v. Corinthian
Coll., Inc., 769 F. Supp. 2d 1336 (D. Utah 2011) (upholding arbitration agreement as conscionable);
Brumley v. Commonwealth Bus. Coll. Educ. Corp., 945 N.E.2d 770 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (holding forprofit school’s arbitration agreement was not fraudulently induced); Jung v. Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls., 300
F.Supp.2d 119 (D.D.C. 2004) (holding that arbitration agreement was not induced by duress).
9

Hill v. Gateway 2000, 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).

10

Id. at 1148; see also Montgomery v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., No. 11 C 365, 2011 WL 1118942 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 25, 2011) (citing to Hill, 105 F.3d 1147 in determining that trade school was not required to read the
arbitration agreement to students).
11

Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148.

12

Id. at 1149.
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schools cannot be required to read the institution’s materials line-by-line to incoming
students. Instead, students are often given an opportunity to read through the rules and
regulations of the educational institution. If they do not want to be bound by them, they
can choose not to attend and receive a tuition refund after a certain amount of time.13

III.

THE ARBITRATION TEMPTATION
A. Treacherous Times for Law Schools

The turbulent waters law schools are currently navigating could be calmed by
arbitration agreements. Law student alumni are targeting their alma maters with an
increasing number of lawsuits; in 2012, fifteen law schools combatted class-action
lawsuits brought by over 75 graduates.14 The lawsuits were based on an assortment of
claims, but primarily consumer fraud.15 The consumer fraud actions were founded on the
allegedly fraudulent statistics that law schools reported to entice a fresh wave of 1Ls to
attend. 16 In essence, law school graduates claimed that the statistics were misleading
about post-graduate employment opportunities. 17 To make matters worse, courts sent
mixed signals regarding the reliability of those statistics.18 This means that law schools
may find themselves warding off consumer fraud actions until the courts have thoroughly
established the confines of legitimate law school employment reporting practices. And
while courts wrestle with that notion, the current legal industry illustrates why some law
schools may choose to push the boundaries of reporting employment data.

13

See HAMLINE UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, REGISTRATION, http://law.hamline.edu/registration.html (last viewed
Apr. 7, 2014) (giving students 10 days from beginning of class to drop without owing tuition or using a
sliding scale after 10 days); UNIV. OF MINN. SCH. OF LAW, REFUND, DROP/ADD DEADLINES,
http://www.law.umn.edu/current/deadlines.html (last viewed Apr. 7, 2014).
14

Vivian Giang, A Bunch of Young Lawyers are Suing Their Law Schools Because They Don’t Have Jobs,
YAHOO! FINANCE (Feb. 15, 2012, 2:56 PM), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/bunch-young-lawyers-suinglaw-195616601.html.
15

See Harnish v. Widener Univ. Sch. of Law., 931 F. Supp. 2d 641 (D.N.J.2013) (graduates, including law
students, suing for inability to find adequate employment); Gomez-Jimenez v. N.Y. Law Sch., 943
N.Y.S.2d 834 (N.Y. 2012) (students sued over misrepresented law employment statistics); MacDonald v.
Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch., 880 F. Supp. 2d 785 (W.D. Mich. 2012) (students sued arguing they
reasonably relied on faulty employment statistics).
16

See, e.g., MacDonald v. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch., No. 1:11CV00831, 2011 WL 3486444 at ¶¶ 34-41
(W.D. Mich. Aug. 10, 2011); Alaburda v. Thomas Jefferson Sch. of Law, No. 37-2011-000091898-CU-FRCTL
(Cal.
Super.
Ct.
Aug.
21,
2012),
available
at
http://www.thomasjeffersonclassaction.com/pdf/Complaint-Documents.pdf.
17

See, e.g., MacDonald, 2011 WL 3486444 at ¶¶ 34-41; Alaburda, No. 37-2011-000091898-CU-FR-CTL.

18

Compare Gomez-Jimenez, 943 N.Y.S.2d at 843 (holding that students that the statistics are accurate
enough for students to make an informed decision about attending law school) with Harnish, 931 F. Supp.
2d 641 (denying law school’s motion to dismiss because law student’s claims were “plausible”).

419

In June 2007, the legal market hit an all-time high for legal field employment
opportunities.19 But in 2012, the legal market fell by 7.8% from that 2007 high.20 The
legal landscape has discouraged many from even attempting to enter law school. 21 It is
reported that the number of LSAT takers from 2012 to 2013 dropped 13%. 22 Fewer
LSAT takers equate to fewer applicants to fill seats in the over 200 accredited law
schools nationwide.23 Also, in 2013, the highly regarded U.S. News’ law school rankings
were rattled after the new scoring method knocked several low ranked schools off the
list.24 Employment placement rates now account for 20% of a law school’s score.25 This
suggests that if a law school were ever going to tweak its numbers, now would be the
ideal time in order to maintain its enrollment.
Law school employment figures, however, are not the only source of studentversus-law-school legal actions. Schools are also warding off lawsuits from students who
are upset over school decisions, such as disciplinary or admissions decisions. 26 Other
legal actions focus on more trivial matters, like a broken chair.27 Even the most trivial
19

Annie Lowrey, A Case of Supply v. Demand, SLATE (OCT. 27, 2010, 4:14 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2010/10/a_case_of_supply_v_demand.html (last visited
Apr. 7, 2014).
20

Id.

21

Elie Mystal, If Associates Don’t Get a Raise, Expect Even Fewer LSAT Takers, ABOVE THE LAW (Mar.
14, 2013, 6:08 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2013/03/if-associates-dont-get-a-raise-expect-even-fewer-lsattakers/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2014).
22

Id.

23

Ethan Bronner, Law Schools’ Applications Fall as Costs Rise and Jobs Are Cut, NEW YORK TIMES (Jan.
30, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/31/education/law-schools-applications-fall-as-costs-rise-andjobs-are-cut.html?_r=0
(last
visited
Apri.
7,
2014);
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/aba_approved_law_schools/in_alphabetical
_order.html (last visited May 14, 2014).
24

Debra Cassents Weiss, US News Rankings Change With Better Jobs Data; Which Law Schools Are Now
Unranked?,
ABA
JOURNAL
(Mar.
12,
2013,
7:05
AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/new_jobs_data_spurs_changes_in_us_news_rankings_which_law
_schools_are_now_u/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2014).
25

Some schools that were the center of litigation, like New York Law School, fell off the rankings. Others
were reported to have fallen 38 places in the latest round of rankings. Id.
26

See Al-Turk v. Univ. of Neb., No. 8:13CV74, 2013 WL 959223 (D.Neb. 2013); Prete v. Roger Williams
Univ. Sch. of Law, Civil No. 12–cv–474–JL, 2012 WL 6203083 (D.N.H.2012) (student sued over alleged
discriminatory practices in early admission decisions); Chan v. Bd. of Regents, Civil Action No. H–12–
0325, 2012 WL 5832494 (S.D.Tex.) (students sued seeking readmission after being expelled for failing to
meet academic requirements).
27

The Daily Caller, Law Student Sues School After She Fell Out of A Chair, YAHOO! NEWS (Mar. 25,
2003), http://news.yahoo.com/law-student-sues-school-she-fell-chair-123409276.html; see also Staci
Zaretsky, Another Law School Sued, But This Time With Allegations of ‘Negligent Enrollment’, ABOVE THE
LAW (Feb. 16, 2013, 1:32 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2012/02/another-law-school-sued-but-this-timewith-allegations-of-negligent-enrollment/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2014) (reporting that one law student is suing
her school for allowing her to enroll when she allegedly was not qualified to attend).
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suit may take years to reach a conclusion. 28 Thus, law schools can face a variety of
ongoing lawsuits, and the use of arbitration agreements could prevent the courts from
publically meddling in their affairs. 29 In fact, courts continue to erode the doctrine of
academic abstention and more readily adjudicate cases they traditionally refused to
resolve.
B. The Destruction of Judicial Abstention in Educational Affairs
Historically, the judiciary has hesitantly adjudicated disputes against educational
institutions. 30 Experts theorize that the judicial branch’s aversion to adjudicate
educational institution issues stems from an inability to resolve disputes due to the
schools’ “polycentric nature.” 31 Universities’ decisions “are products of complex
interactions” that the judiciary cannot parse through in deciding an outcome. 32 Courts
would also not have access to every necessary party, because the law protects certain
interests or relationships in the education context.33 And in coming to a decision, courts
would have to speculate the needs of higher education institutions, a task they simply
could not accurately complete.34
More recently, the historically hesitant courts are adhering to academic abstention
in only a small number of cases regarding academic disciplinary and admission
decisions. 35 This trend would likely leave courts with broad discretion over false
advertising and consumer fraud lawsuits against the schools. The dissolution of academic
28

Lucero v. Curators., No. WD 74768, 2013 WL 519460 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (decided in 2013 after
charges were filed in 2008 stemming from a 2007 charge against the school’s faculty).
29

See infra section III(c).

30

See Regents v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 (1985) (“[F]ar less is [the federal court] suited to evaluate the
substance of the multitude of academic decisions that are made daily by faculty members of public
educational institutions-decisions that require ‘an expert evaluation of cumulative information and [are] not
readily adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or administrative decisionmaking.’” (citation omitted));
see also Abdullah v. State, 771 N.W.2d 246 (N.D. 2009).
31

Edward N. Stoner II & J. Michael Showalter, Judicial Deference to Educational Judgment: Justice
O'Connor's Opinion in Grutter Reapplies Longstanding Principles, as Shown by Rulings Involving College
Students in the Eighteen Months Before Grutter, 30 J.C. & U.L. 583, 587 (2004) (citing James
Leonard, Judicial Deference to Academic Standards Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Titles
II and III of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 75 NEB. L. REV. 27, 74 (1996)).
32

Id.

33

James Leonard, Judicial Deference to Academic Standards Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
and Titles II and III of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 75 NEB. L. REV. 27, 74 (1996).
34

Supra note 31.

35

See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (holding a law school’s admission criteria could
use race as a basis to create a diverse community within the law school and that decision conformed to the
“tradition of giving a degree of deference to a university's academic decisions . . . .”); Harwood v. Johns
Hopkins Univ., 747 A.2d 205, 209 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (holding courts must continue cautiously
when dealing with university disciplinary actions).
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abstention may be enough of a threat for law schools to contract arbitration agreements to
maintain discretion over their affairs. Some proprietary schools have already taken the
threat to heart.
C. Follow the Leader: Proprietary Schools36
Recently, just like some law schools, proprietary schools have faced litigation due
to employment statistics reporting. 37 In the past decade, commentators have targeted
proprietary schools with harsh criticism. Critics argue that in order to compete with
traditionally cheaper community colleges, “proprietary schools often must offer
enrollment at comparable prices, increasing pressure on proprietary schools to maximize
enrollment numbers and tuition payments.” 38 This places pressure on the schools to
market aggressively and, in doing so, misrepresent employment prospects to potential
students.39 Because of these questionable tactics, for-profit schools are claimed to use
arbitration agreements as a defensive measure to mitigate the legal and public damages of
consumer fraud claims.40 Additionally, recent case law favoring arbitration agreements
can be cited as further incentive for proprietary schools’ use of arbitration clauses.
Experts argue that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion inhibits judicial review standards of proprietary schools’ fraudulent
practices.41 This notion is hard to disagree with because many favorable court decisions
for proprietary schools have relied on Concepcion.42 The holding in Concepcion is even

36

For the remainder of this article, “proprietary school” will refer to “for-profit colleges and universities
[that] are managed and governed by private organizations and corporations.” For Profit Colleges and
Universities, NCSL (July. 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/educ/for-profit-colleges-anduniversities.aspx (last visited April 7, 2014)
37

See In re Kaplan Higher Educ. Corp., 235 S.W.3d 206, 208 (Tex. 2007) (involving students suing forprofit school for misrepresenting employment statistics); Marshall v. ITT Technical Inst., No. 3:11–CV–
552, 2012 WL 1565453 (E.D. Tenn. 2012) (student sued proprietary school claiming that institution
misrepresented employment prospects).
38

Patrick F. Linehan, Dreams Protected: A New Approach to Policing Proprietary Schools'
Misrepresentations, 89 GEO. L.J. 753, 757 (2001).
39

Id. at 759 (citing Delta Sch. of Com., Inc. v. Wood, 766 S.W.2d 424 (Ark. 1989) (holding that school
induced students to enroll based on false promises of salary and employment opportunities)). Additionally,
disturbing statistics from 1992-1997 show fraudulent misrepresentations and deceptive marketing practices
forced closures or removed federal loan eligibility from nearly 800 for-profit trade schools. Id. at 760
(citing Charles R. Babcock, Loan Abuses by Some Trade Schools Leave Taxpayers with Big Bill, WASH.
POST, Oct. 29, 1997, at A1).
40

See Amanda Harmon Cooley, The Need For Legal Reform Of The For-Profit Educational Industry, 79
TENN. L. REV. 515, 538-40 (2012).
41

Charles Pollack, An American Crisis: Proprietary Schools and National Student Debt, 1 Am. U. Bus. L.
Rev. 137, 157-60 (2012). It is necessary to note that in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion the Supreme
Court upheld an arbitration clause in a cellphone contract requiring arbitration for any legal disputes and
disallowing class actions. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748-54 (2011).
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being marked as a “serious blow to consumer class actions and likely foreclos[ing] the
possibility of any recovery for many wronged individuals” as courts rule in favor of forprofit institutions.43
Although, it is not only Concepcion’s holding that is establishing legal hurdles for
student consumers. Additional precedent has established a defensive shield, allowing
arbitration agreements to protect academic institutions from the ramifications of their
allegedly fraudulent behavior.44 The secretive nature of arbitration proceedings will not
alert the public of any deceptive behavior. In fact, experts cite to the publicity of recent
multi-million dollar settlements in proprietary school litigation as the motivation for other
for-profit schools to stonewall class action lawsuits via arbitration agreements.45 Thus,
proprietary schools have laid the foundation for law schools to securely implement
arbitration agreements and defraud aspiring lawyers if they so choose, so long as the
arbitration agreements are conscionable.46

42

See Affiliated Computer Serv., Inc. v. Fensterstock, 611 F.3d 124, cert granted, (U.S. Jun. 13, 2011) (No.
10-987) (remanding case back to US Court of Appeals for further consideration in light of Concepcion);
Marshall, 2012 WL 1565453 (granting proprietary schools’ motion to dismiss based on principals in
Concepcion); Mitchell v. Career Educ. Corp., No. 4:11cv1581 TCM, 2011 WL 6009658 (E.D. Mo. 2011)
(granting motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims of unconscionability of arbitration agreement with for-profit
school). It is also necessary to note that Concepcion has been greatly cited in cases warding off class
actions in other consumer contract contexts. See David Segal, A Rising Tide Against Class-Action Suits, N.
Y. TIMES, May 5, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/06/your-money/class-actions-face-hurdle-in2011-supreme-court-ruling.html?_r=0 (last visited Apr. 1, 2014).
43

Bernal v. Burnett, 793 F.Supp.2d 1280, 1288 (D. Colo. 2011). In Bernal v. Burnett, students brought a
class action against a trade school alleging misrepresentation of attendance costs, likelihood of job
placement, and salary expectations upon graduation. Id. at 1282. However, prior to participating in classes,
students signed an arbitration agreement. Id. at 1282-84. The court held the agreement could only be
invalidated if the arbitration clause was found to be unconscionable and ultimately saw Concepcion
creating “broad enough implications that it constitutes an intervening change in the applicable legal
context.” Id. at 1285.
44

See, e.g., Bernal, 793 F.Supp.2d at 1287-88 (compelling arbitration despite court being “sympathetic”
towards Plaintiffs); Marshall, 2012 WL 1565453, at *5 (holding arbitration valid in dispute over
misrepresented employment statistics).
45

One proprietary school settled a lawsuit after cutting a check for $40 million and offering up to $20,000
refunds to some 8,500 students. Supra note 40, at 539 (citing Terence Chea, Culinary School Grads Claim
They
Were
Ripped
Off,
MSNBC.COM
(Sept.
4,
2011,
5:35
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/06/culinary-school-grads-ripped-off_n_950107.html).
The
culinary school later claimed that the case was too expensive to litigate. Id.
46

Bernal, 793 F.Supp.2d at 1287; see also Fallo v. High-Tech Inst., 559 F.3d 874, 876 (8th Cir. 2009)
(holding arbitration provision was conscionable because it was not hidden in the student contract); Brumley
v. Commonwealth Bus. Coll. Educ. Corp., 945 N.E.2d 770 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that arbitration
agreement was conscionable despite students claiming they were not allowed to read the contract before
agreeing to it).

423

IV.

THE GOOD,
SCHOOLS

THE

BAD,

AND THE

UGLY TRUTH

OF

ARBITRATION CLAUSES

IN

LAW

A. Arguments for Arbitration: Applying Education-Based Arguments
In general, arbitration is considered to be an amicable solution for students and
their academic institutions, because it promises a fair and affordable solution compared to
students’ current outlets for grievances.47
Traditionally, students who disagree with academic institutions’ administration
decisions have only two solutions: school committees or the court system.48 However, it
is suggested that a school committee can reflect an unfair tribunal to students, mainly
because committees are often made up of a panel of school officials. 49 Furthermore,
critics of committee reviews cite that members who make the determinations often lack
experience or knowledge in dispute resolution techniques.50 These same panel members
also must continue to work with faculty members who were part of the dispute, making
neutrality an even more difficult task. 51 Higher-education institutions also often lack
procedures or guidelines for the committee members to guide their decision, adding
“confusion and uncertainty to the inherent unpleasantries of such decision-making.”52 A
student can sometimes appeal the decision if it is not deemed final, but only to a different
panel of school administrators.53 Alternatively to school committees, the student could
chance judicial review, but that may lead to the dead-end of judicial abstention, as
discussed above.54 Regardless, judicial intervention is costly for both students and their
respective institutions. 55 Thus, if arbitration is selected as the method of dispute
resolution instead of these two traditional procedures, it could prove to be a useful tool to
traverse the complex disputes of educational institutions.56
47

See generally Donna Biaklik et al., Higher Education: Fertile Ground for ADR, 49-Mar DISP. RESOL. J.
61 (1994). The author believes many of the arguments for arbitrating educational disputes can be applied
universally and, in this case, to law schools.
48

Id. at 61-62; see also Academic Policy Manuel, Academic Standards Policies, Academic Performance
and Grading, Grade Changes, ST. THOMAS SCHOOL OF LAW, http://www.stthomas.edu/law/academics/
academicpolicymanual/academicstandardspolicies/academicperformanceandgrading/gradechanges/
(last
visited March 31, 2014) (requiring Grade Appeal Committee to determine grade disputes).
49

Id.

50

Biaklik et al., supra note 47, at 62.

51

Id.

52

Id.

53

Biaklik et al., supra note 47, at 62.

54

Id.

55

Biaklik et al., supra note 47, at 62.

56

See id. at 64.
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Since academic disputes can be intricate, retired professors or academic
administrators from nearby institutions trained in ADR techniques could be selected to
arbitrate. 57 Selected arbitrators would mitigate any unfair perceptions that may be
inherent with school committees.58 Furthermore, the transparency of arbitration clauses
could establish procedures and time limits for students to follow, allowing for a more
predictable process for students. 59 In allowing student claims to be arbitrated, two
benefits would result.
First, the doctrine of academic abstention would be revived because arbitration
agreements would, once again, solidify the historical deference of academic issues by the
judicial branch. 60 Secondly, while not referenced in academic settings specifically,
arbitration clauses are held to preserve reputations when matters “could have a significant
impact on a disputant's reputation.” 61 With research suggesting that an educational
institution’s reputation is key for attracting new students, it is understandable why a law
school could benefit from an arbitration agreement. 62 While persuasive, the forgoing
reasons fail to take into account many inherent problems with using arbitration
agreements.
B. Arguments Against Arbitrating: Applying Consumer Protection Arguments
At its most diluted form, investing in education is a consumer transaction.63 For
law students, it is an expensive transaction, no matter where a student opts to attend; the
average tuition cost for a private school is $40,585 a year, and $23,590 a year for in-state
students at a public institution. 64 In consumer situations, opponents of arbitration
agreements believe that arbitration is not an alternate dispute resolution, but rather a
modification of the substantive rights of consumers. 65 In other words,
57

Id. at 65.

58

Id. at 64.

59

Id. at 65.

60

See Biaklik et al., supra note 47, at 66.

61

ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN GEORGIA § 9:5 (3d ed. 2006).

62

Geoffrey N. Soutar & Julia P. Turner, Students’ Preferences for University: A Conjoint Analysis, 16
INT’L J. EDUC. MGMT 40, 41 (2002) (citing L. Lin, What are Student Education and Educational Related
Needs?, 25 MKTG. & RES. TODAY 199, 199-212 (1997) (suggesting that prospective students who had a
positive attitude toward a university rated it more highly)).
63

Consumer transaction is defined as “a bargain or deal in which a party acquires property or services
primarily for a personal… purpose.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
64

Karen Sloan, Tuition is Still Growing; Despite Lagging Law School Applications, It Vastly Exceeds
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“consumer arbitration is often simply a way for a business to reduce the number of
disputes, avoid the courts and juries, and achieve more favorable results”: a notion
backed by empirical studies.66
In some studies, arbitration agreements are cited as an easy way for businesses to
maneuver around unfavorable laws.67 Even if the law is substantially unfair to businesses,
courts may never have the opportunity to overturn precedent if disputes avoid judicial
review altogether.68 But it seems that businesses will not risk facing financial damages in
hopes of changing the law, especially when arbitration offers favorable results. 69
Additionally, arbitrators are not bound by the rules of the courts, which does not allow a
consumer to adequately predict outcomes.70 Adding to the unpredictability, arbitrators are
not required to write reasons for their decisions nor publish them.71 Therefore, unlike the
judiciary bound by the doctrines of stare decisis, arbitrators can often secretly make
binding decisions regardless of what has happened in the past. 72 It would seem that
arbitration agreements would surreptitiously protect a law school’s reputation and
finances, while substantially leaving current and prospective law students in the lurch.
C. Arbitration Agreements: The Cons Outweigh the Pros
The “pros” and “cons” of applying arbitration to law schools suggest that
arbitration can serve either a beneficial or destructive function. However, since the bulk
of disputes focus around law schools’ employment reporting practices, arbitration
66
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ADVOC. 135 (2004) (finding that Alabama auto dealers, fearing substantial judgments against them from
the current laws, enacted arbitration agreements to maneuver around the laws)).
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agreements would cripple current and prospective law students’ rights as consumers.73
Law schools could arguably hide behind arbitration agreements, like some proprietary
schools reportedly do, and thus protect a crucial element of gaining new students: their
reputations.74
Arbitrators’ awards are kept secret and would add to a possibly endless cycle of
disputes. 75 For example, if a law student were to win an arbitrated dispute for
misrepresentation, the award’s secrecy would prevent other students from falling into the
same deceptive trap (assuming one exists). The law school’s reputation would remain
publically untarnished and continue to attract aspiring lawyers. 76 This is arguably
evidenced by the fact that proprietary schools remain a multi-million dollar business,
drawing in an increasing number of students. 77 The accuracy of some proprietary
schools’ employment numbers are uncertain until either a student defensively voids the
arbitration provision or an arbitrator’s decision is made public.78 Similarly, if law schools
were to establish arbitration agreements, law students could not adequately protect
themselves. But even if the awards were made public, there is still the possibility of bias.
The area of arbitration is relatively hazy when it comes to the utility of arbitration
as an alternative dispute method.79 Studies of the credit card industry point to inherent
arbitrator biases.80 There is little to suggest that arbitrators would not carry biases into a
dispute between a law school and its students.81 In fact, the legal community is often
cited as a tight-knit community where reputation is everything. 82 Some of those
73
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communal ties go back to law schools and an arbitrator’s alma mater.83 In an effort to not
destroy those ties, it can be suggested that an arbitrator may favor his alma mater or legal
tie in making a decision. Even ADR experts suggest that co-workers will favor one
another in dispute resolution settings. 84
V.

Conclusion

Arbitration is a useful tool, but only if the tool matches the job. For law schools,
there are many temptations to bind potential and current students to arbitrate disputes.
However, arbitration agreements could hide a law school’s potentially deceptive practices
from current or prospective students. The damage this would cause to a student marks the
necessity for preventing all laws schools from imposing arbitration agreements at all.
Nevertheless, law schools are currently free to use arbitration agreements until there is
successful legislative intervention.85
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